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Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, 
the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role 
it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that 
provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market 
under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. 
This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public 
debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth of the domestic public debt during 
the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. The main culprit is 
the very high and risky interest rate, with the recognition of old debts (hidden liabilities and 
state debt renegotiation) coming in second. Section  3 computes Value at Risk and Cash 
Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public debt. These risk measures show that the 
current composition of the public debt is very risky. The rollover risk is introduced in a 
mean-variance framework in Section 4, and the maturity structure evolution is discussed. 
The increased riskness was the cost to improve the maturity structure. Section 5 discusses a 
few issues pertaining to the overlap between debt management and monetary policy. 
Finally, Section 6 wraps up with policy discussion and policy recommendations. 
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Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, 
the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role 
it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that 
provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market 
under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. 
 
This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public 
debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth of the domestic public debt during 
the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. The main culprit is 
the very high and risky interest rate, with the recognition of old debts (hidden liabilities and 
state debt renegotiation) coming in second. Although there are no reasons to suppose that 
the future will replicate the past, simulations show that the maintenance of substantial 
primary surplus is essential to keep the debt path sustainable.  
 
Section 3 computes Value at Risk and Cash Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public 
debt. These risk measures show that the current composition of the public debt is very 
risky. Volatility increases precisely when the economy weakens, draining fiscal resources 
to serve the debt precisely when they are less plenty. 
 
The rollover risk is introduced in a mean-variance framework in Section 4, and the maturity 
structure evolution is discussed. The increased riskness was the cost to improve the 
maturity structure, i.e., market risk was increased while refinancing risk was reduced. The 
recent emergence of large discounts on the zero-duration bonds, requiring the Treasury to 
shorten the debt seems to be a further unfortunate step. Not only the debt structure is 
extremely risky from the market risk perspective, but also the Treasury is being 
increasingly pressured to shorten the debt, thereby increasing the refinancing risk, because 
of the perception that credit risk has increased. 
 
Section 5 relates debt management to monetary policy. It reviews the origins of the current 
problems in the debt market, and explains how the two policies operate in Brazil. It shows 
that reserve requirements serve many purposes. Because of this, they are likely to remain 
around for a long time. The current difficulties in rolling over long debt are analyzed. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents policy discussion and policy recommendations. 
 
2- Decomposing the Public Debt Growth 
During the period 1995-2001, the Brazilian federal domestic public bonded debt more than 
quadrupled in real (percentage of GDP) terms.  This Section decomposes the domestic 
federal bonded debt growth, searching for the macroeconomic causes of the very large 
growth that took place during the last seven-year period. We attempt to quantify the 
contraction and expansion sources of the federal  bonded debt. The methodology used was 
developed in Bevilaqua and Garcia [2002], where it is thoroughly explained. Table 1.1 displays the factors of expansion and contraction of the federal public bonded 
debt (in  nominal terms). One must keep in mind that,  since we are working with nominal 
values over a seven-year-period, the values presented on this table can be misleading.
1 The 
most important individual factor for debt growth was interest payments (61.04% of the total 
variation of R$535.343.38 ), followed  by the accumulation of the states' debt (32.60%). 
This is a debt that several Brazilian state governments owe to the federal government, the 
actual repayment of which will remain an open question in the next years. These two items 
alone add up to 93.64% of the total variation in the domestic federal bonded debt.  
Table 1.2 displays the factors of expansion and contraction of the federal public debt (as 
percentage of GDP). The analysis in real terms is the most relevant to the current economic 
situation The  interest rate share increased even more in real terms: interest payments 
(32.43% of GDP) alone exceeded the full variation of the federal net debt (20.19% of GDP) 
and was almost equal to the total variation of the domestic federal bonded debt (36.13% of 
GDP). If we compute the implicit real interest rate on the net debt, by dividing the nominal 
interest payments by the preceding net debt stock, we get the following figures: 
Table 2.3 Excess Interest Rates on the Net Debt 
 
The line I(t)/D(t-1) contains the  implicit net debt nominal interest rate, obtained through the 
division of the nominal interest payments in year t by the debt stock at the end of the 
previous year. Subtracting from this nominal interest rate the GDP growth rate (Y(t)/Y(t-
1)), we obtain a  measure of the excess of the nominal rate in relation to nominal GDP 
growth, which is the relevant variable to access how important the interest payments are in 
the growth of the debt to GDP ratio.
2  Note that these implicit interest rates measure a 
lagged average of the current market rates. The lag length depends on the debt average 
remaining life, and its composition. For nominal debt, an interest rate increase would only 
show up in the figures above when the existing bonds at the time of the interest rate 
increase started to mature, and new ones were issued with a higher interest rate. However, 
                                                 
1 We preferred to present first the nominal values so that the total value to be explained was equal to that 
published by the Central Bank. 
2 The following equation represents the simplest debt dynamics, where D is the total debt, i is the interest rate 
and X is public deficit: 
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d and x are the total debt and the public deficit over GDP, g is the growth rate of real GDP and p is the rate of 
inflation. 
Therefore, if the fiscal deficit is zero, the debt to GDP ratio will grow whenever the nominal interest rate in 
excess of nominal GDP growth is positive. This is equivalent to the real interest rate being higher than the real 
GDP growth rate. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
I(t)/D(t-1) 28.45% 25.28% 15.99% 32.43% 38.43% 17.37% 18.82%
Y(t)/Y(t-1) 1.3401 1.1982 1.1091 1.0292 1.1311 1.0923 1.0841
(1+I(t)/D(t-1))/(Y(t)/Y(t-1)) -4.22% 4.55% 4.58% 28.68% 22.38% 7.45% 9.60%if the debt is indexed to the interest rate or to other indices positively correlated with it, then 
the effect of the interest rate increase is either immediate or occurs sooner. 
With this in mind, we may interpret the figures. The implicit excess interest rates were 
negative or low until 1997, and jumped upwards after the start of the crises period in that 
year with the Asian crisis. 1998 and 1999 were years of extremely high interest rates, both 
because of the very high interest rates, and because of the devaluation, which impacted the 
US$-linked debt. In 2000, the implicit interest rate fell, and in 2001 it increased somewhat. 
Given that 2001 was also a crisis year, with successive interest rate increases in Brazil (the 
basic interest rate was raised from 15.25% in January to 19% in July), we may conclude 
that in the floating exchange rate regime, international crises no longer have such a heavy 
impact on the debt growth.  Nevertheless, the figures for 2000 and 2001 are still cause for 
concern, since they are not as close to zero as required to provide stability to the debt to 
GDP ratio.  
The recognition of existing debts (skeletons) added up to 12.87% of GDP, with the bulk of 
it occurring during the 1999-2001 period. One would hope that most of the skeletons would 
already be out of the closet. However, bad surprises still occur quite often, and it would be 
an excellent measure if the government could do an exhaustive job of opening every and 
each closet to convey to the market what the bad shocks in the future will be. More 
important, it should make sure that the new skeletons are not currently being manufactured.  
The fiscal responsibility law is a major deterrent  against the creation of unfunded liabilities. 
However, the inventiveness of some public officials in bypassing the spirit of the law is 
always amazing, as it can be seen by the mushrooming of state and municipal pension 
plans. It is quite likely that as these insufficiently funded pension plans start to have more 
retirees, a new skeleton will come out of the closet.   
Privatizations revenues accounted only to less than half of the recognition of existing debts 
(6.09% of GDP). As far as privatizations are concerned, the performance of the period 
1999-2001 in comparison to the previous four-year period is not so good, reflecting the 
general slow-down in economic reforms that marked the second term of president Cardoso. 
The asset accumulation (16.24% of GDP) was almost completely accounted for by the 
increase in domestic assets (16.02%), many of which contain large credit risk. The state 
debts that were renegotiated constituted the bulk of the domestic assets (14.09% of GDP).
3 
Foreign Reserves were kept almost c onstant as percentage of GDP, thereby making the 
                                                 
3  It is claimed that the recent history provides evidence showing that the Central Government (CG) has the 
means to enforce the states to fulfill their obligations.  In fact, CG has withheld transfers to Minas Gerais in 
the famous episode of January, 1999, forcing the state to pay before sitting to the table to renegotiate. While 
this has certainly been true during the second Cardoso administration, many doubts remain on what will be 
the stance of the next federal administration. For example, the politician that has always complained about the 
burden imposed by the debt renegotiation and has, so far unsuccessfully, tried to renegotiate the debt under 
more favorable terms,  is the mayor of São Paulo, who belongs to the same party of the front runner in the 
October presidential election. It seems only natural to doubt whether the current stance of keeping the original 
terms of the debt renegotiation will be kept in the event that the main opposition party winning. And, if the 
debt is once again renegotiated with one debtor, all others will want (and probably obtain) the more favorable 
terms. Given that the terms of the currently valid renegotiation are a key factor for the primary surplus 
maintenance, this is an extremely important risk factor for the fiscal stance of the next administration. whole Asset Accumulation much less attractive as an indicator of solvency. This is one of 
the reasons why many analysts prefer to look at the gross debt, instead at the net debt as a 
measure of fiscal solvency.  
Other debts also remained fairly stable, while the foreign debt increased 2.12% of GDP. 
This increase reflects basically the change in the real exchange rate after the 1999 
devaluation, and not an increase in the foreign debt in US dollars. 
Therefore, the picture that emerges from the analysis of the very large increase in the 
domestic bonded debt is one where the privatization revenues were insufficient to 
counteract the appearance of lagged fiscal deficits, in the form of the renegotiation of the 
state debts and other liabilities (skeletons), as well as the large interest payments. Those 
figures highlight the importance of avoiding the creation of new skeletons which may haunt 
the debt figures in the future, and of lowering the still very high interest rates. 
 
3.Risk Measures for the Public Debt 
Before introducing the risk measures, let us first complement the previous Section with a 
description of the debt composition during the Real Plan. Figure 1 displays the evolution of 
the federal domestic bonded debt structure since the start of the Real Plan, in July, 1994. 
Besides the very large and fast growth after mid-1995, whose determinants were analyzed 
in Section 2, the change in debt structure is also remarkable. Figure 2 displays the same 
data in a different graph format, so that the changes in composition are more clearly visible. 
The US$-linked bonds have grown during the whole period, both in real terms, as well as in 
percentage of the total domestic bonded debt. After an initial growth in the years following 
the beginning of the Real Plan, the share of pre-fixed (nominal) bonds have decreased 
dramatically, since the Russian crisis, being of small importance in the recent years, despite 
the iterated official intentions of issuing a larger share of nominal bonds.
4 The place of the 
nominal bonds was taken by the zero-duration (Selic) bonds.
5 These bonds constitute 
nowadays the majority of the domestic public bonded debt. Although the price-level-linked 
debt has increased its share in the total domestic b onded debt, its importance is still quite 
small. Other indexes account for some 5% of the debt. 
                                                 
4 See STN [2001], where the Treasury intended to have 22% of the total debt as nominal bonds until 
December 2001. The document is available at:   
http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/hp/downloads/plano_financiamento_divida_8.4.pdf 
5 The bond indexed to the short-run interest rate (Selic) is a security sold at a discount which had its face 
value corrected daily by the average daily i nterest rates during its term. It is a floating interest rate, adapted to 
the high frequency required by the high inflation and daily indexation conditions prevalent when it was 
created (1985). It would be equivalent to a bond whose nominal value is accrued every day by the daily 
accrual of the Libor. This is the closest one can get to perfect indexation in fixed income markets. It 
corresponds to a bond of duration zero (that being the reason why we call this type of bond  zero-duration 
bond), since it practically does not suffer any price fall when interest rates go up. These bonds were widely 
used in times of high uncertainty, as, for example,  the crossover to the Cruzado Plan in 1986. On the other 
hand, monetary policy has a very limited  wealth effect, as far as public is concerned, since rises in interest 
rates do not affect the value of the private financial wealth in these fixed income securities. As far as average remaining life is concerned, the debt has been lengthened quite 
substantially, as the nominal (short-term) bonds were replaced by the zero-duration bonds. 
However, average duration has not increased nearly quite as much. This discrepancy shows 
that refinancing (rollover) risk was given higher priority than market risk, as will be further 
discussed when we introduce a few risk measures. 
The right risk measure to use depends on the agent’s characteristics. The Brazilian Treasury 
defines in its Annual Borrowing Plan (Brazilian Treasury, 2001) the objective of debt 
management as to minimize long-term funding costs of the government under prudent risk 
limits. The risks comprise refinancing risk, market risk, foreign exchange event risk, and 
concentration risk (Fratzscher and del Valle, 2002). Private agents care about a different set 
of risks, e.g., market, credit and liquidity risks. Depending on the  agent, the focus on one 
risk or the other may be different. Pension funds have a much longer horizon than money-
market funds, which must provide daily liquidity to their participants. This means that not 
only liquidity risk is much more important to money-market funds, but also that the 
relevant volatilities used to measure market risk must be computed differently for these two 
agents, due to the different time horizon of each of them. 
From the point of view of the debt issuer (the Brazilian Treasury) the g oal, of course, is to 
use the different risk measures to provide policy recommendations on which securities to 
issue given the market conditions. The best way to construct such encompassing risk 
measure is probably through a multiperiod simulation model such as the CAR (Cost at 
Risk) used by several countries. The construction of such model is a task beyond the scope 
of this paper, and should be undertaken by the Brazilian Treasury in the near future. Last 
year, I supervised a student in constructing a prototype simulation model focused on debt 
composition (Azeredo, 2002). Here, a simple simulation model emphasizes the effects of 
shocks on the primary budget.  These two aspects should be combined in a much more 
detailed model to serve as a policy tool to the Brazilian Treasury. The maturity structure, 
which is the key determinant for the rollover or refinancing risk, should also be modeled. 
Here, we provide a few measures of the recent evolution of the maturity structure, and 
discuss its relation to the debt composition, as well as the risks. 
From the point of view of the debt holder, several different risk measures are available. The 
most widely used risk measure in the Brazilian markets is the  V@R (value at risk). 
Although this measure focus exclusively on the short-term market risk, it is widely used, 
and it has become more so as regulation has required even investors with a longer time 
horizon to daily mark-to-market their portfolios. We provide here a measure of the V@R of 
the debt. Although the V@R does not adequately gauge the risk from the Treasury’s 
perspective, it is a useful tool to measure the risk relevant to most market players, and, 
therefore, could be used as an ancillary tool to debt management. 
V@R is defined as … the worst expected loss over a given horizon under normal market 
conditions at a given confidence level (Jorion, 2001, p. xxii). The basic idea is to have one 
number that summarizes the risk involved in the overall portfolio of a financial institution. 
There are several different methodologies to generate this number. The easiest one is the 
delta-normal. It assumes that the returns of the different assets and liabilities of a portfolio are multinormally  distributed with zero mean.
6 Since the portfolio’s return is a weighted 
sum of the multinormally distributed individual returns, it is also normally distributed. 
Therefore, if we take the difference between the portfolio value today, and the 5
th percentile 
of its distribution tomorrow, we obtain the worst expected loss over a day under normal 
market conditions at a 95% confidence level, i.e., it is expected that only in 5% of the 
times, the loss will be over the V@R limit. 
In spite of not being the ideal risk measure from the government point of view, the public 
bonded debt  V@R may provide many interesting insights. For example, the large nominal 
deficits registered in 1999 and 2001 were in great measure caused by the increase in value 
of the domestic debt due to the indexation clauses present in several bonds, both to the 
exchange rate and to the short term interest rate. Therefore, it is very important that the risk 
involved in the debt structure be adequately accessed, so that policy makers and the public 
can evaluate the true risk/reward tradeoff involved in public debt management.  
The task of providing an assessment of the risks hidden in the indexed debt has become 
even more important after the second revision of the agreement with the IMF
7 on 
3/26/2002, when the Brazilian Central Bank was allowed to resume some trading in 
derivatives markets to rollover the existing exchange rate linked debt. Derivatives are off-
balance-sheet items, usually with purchasing prices far below (zero for futures, forwards 
and swaps) the potential loss that they may entail. Therefore, the only way one may 
appraise the potential loss involved in these items is through a risk measure as the V@R. 
In Section 3.1 we spell out the methodology to construct the public debt V@R, and show 
its evolution since the devaluation in 1999. Section 3.2 contains the description of the 
CF@R methodology, as well as the relevant numbers. Finally, Section 3.3 puts the two 
methodologies together to construct a single measure for risk assessment. 
 
3.1. Value-at-Risk (V@R) 
3.1.1. Nominal Bonds 
The methodology to compute the V@R for nominal bonds is quite standard. Jorion [2001] 
is a good reference, and Appendix 1 details the formulae used and data sources. 
TheV@R is constructed accordingly to the following steps. At any given date, we depart 
from the redemption schedule of the nominal bonds. Therefore, for each day, we have a list 
of future dates when coupons and/or the principals are repaid, with the present value 
(evaluated with the yield curve of that day) of those cash flows. 
                                                 
6 The multinormality assumption is clearly an heroic one that is undertaken because it greatly simplifies the 
computation, by avoiding the need to simulate. 
7 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2001/pr0138.htm. Given the history of interest rate variations, our goal is to compute the worst plausible 
outcome, defined as the 95
th percentile
8 of the distribution of the possible (stochastic) 
values of the total nominal debt in the following day. The standard V@R methodology 
assumes that the returns are multinormally distributed with zero means and standard 
deviations and covariances to be estimated from the data. Therefore, the distribution of the 
overall portfolio return, by virtue of being a linear convex combination of the multinormal 
returns (weighted by the respective present values) is also normal, allowing us to compute 
the 95
th percentile with the help of a standard normal distribution table. 
Since the redemption schedule contains payments arbitrarily spread over future dates, we 
must choose a few dates (time vertices) to concentrate the payments, so that we can 
compute variances (and covariances) for those yields (interest rates). Having done that, for 
each day, we must also compute the variance covariance matrix for the time vertices. This 
is done through the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model. [Jorion 
(2001), pages 193-196] 
Figure 3  shows the evolution of the volatilities (standard-deviations) of the daily interest 
rates for the following time vertices: 5 days, 20 days, 40 days, 60 days, 80 days, 100 days, 
150 days, 200 days, 250 days. To compute those volatilities, we were forced to use data 
from the derivatives markets at the BM&F—The Brazilian Commodities and Futures 
Exchange—, since there are no liquid secondary markets for government bonds in Brazil. 
Therefore, our calculations must be interpreted as an approximation that excludes liquidity 
risk, and most of the credit risk. This is because lack of liquidity may cause the actual value 
loss when trying to sell a government security in any given day to be larger than the one 
implied by the movements in interest rates. Furthermore, non-deliverable derivatives, as the 
ones used at the BM&F, carry much less credit risk than government bonds, because only 
the changes in yields generate cash flows that are backed by collateral (mostly in 
government bonds). In other words, in both cases, the credit risk is associated with public 
debt default. However, in such a credit event, public debt holders would lose 100%, while 
derivatives holders would only lose what they have gained, which is usually much less than 
the derivatives notional value. 
Figure 3 makes clear that the longer the period, the higher the volatility, so that the 
volatility yield curve would always be positively sloped. It also displays a pattern where 
spikes in all volatilities are followed by a decrease until another spike is reached. This 
pattern is due to the EWMA model. 
For example, look at the beginning of the period, January 13, 1999, when the Real was 
floated. When that happened, interest rates for all vertices shot up, and that shows up in the 
increased volatility. The same data point of 1/13/99 also appears in the computation of the 
following day volatility, but with a lower weight (we used 0.95 as the decay factor). 
Therefore, until another shock makes interest rates increase a lot, the volatilities display a 
long-term mean reversion pattern. In that respect, it is interesting to note that until the end 
                                                 
8 We use here the 95
th percentile instead of the 5
th percentile because for the government what constitutes risk 
is a higher debt, while for banks’ portfolios, the risk is a lower portfolio value. Given the symmetry of the 
normal distribution, the result is exactly the same. of 2001 the long-term averages have not reverted to the lower level that prevailed until the 
first quarter of 2001, when the situation in Argentina worsened substantially. 
Figure 4 shows both the total value of the nominal bonds (RHS scale), as well as the V@R 
(LHS scale), defined as the difference between the 95
th and the 50
th  percentiles, 
corresponding to the worst plausible daily increase in the nominal debt value. The V@R 
increases fivefold after the floating (due to the increase in the volatilities), reaching over 
half billion R$ falling afterwards until the end of 1999. In the periods when the volatilities 
are falling, the V@R responds more clearly to the change in the t otal value of the debt. 
After March, 2001, when Brazil was hit by the Argentina contagion, the V@R shot back to 
half billion R$, although the total value was three times larger than in January, 1999. 
Figure 5 computes the  V@R as a percentage of the total nominal debt. The picture shows 
that the immediately after the devaluation, the interest rate variations were so high that the 
daily  V@R was around 1.5%, an extremely high figure, even for a variable i ncome 
portfolio, let alone a fixed income one denominated in the domestic currency. Other peaks 
occurred, as analyzed in the previous paragraphs, but the % V@R never went above half of 
the initial peak. The main reason for the d ecrease in the maximum  V@R is that, in the 
floating exchange rate regime, the impact of crises (negative external shocks) are jointly 
shared by the interest and the exchange rate. For example, in March 2001, not only interest 
rates were increased, but also the exchange rate depreciated.  
Notwithstanding the decrease in the interest volatility, it remains quite high, being a 
fundamental deterrent to the lengthening of the nominal debt. A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation help clarify the point. In Brazil, the interest rate volatility remains high enough 
even for the short maturities traded nowadays. Since the sensitivity of bond prices to the 
interest rate may be well approximated by the duration, which is similar to the maturity, w e 
may conclude that if there were markets for longer term nominal bonds (say, five or ten 
years), the  V@R would be much higher than variable income markets, defeating the very 
purpose of investing in fixed income securities. Therefore, it remains a tough, if not 
impossible, challenge to lengthen the debt with nominal bonds in the current Brazilian 
macroeconomic conditions. 
3.1.2. Exchange-Rate-Linked Bonds 
 
The computation of the  V@R for US dollar-linked bonds is similar to the one for nominal 
bonds. Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the calculation process. Here we shall 
emphasize the intuition. Suppose we were working with returns in US dollars. If that were 
the case, the calculation would be the same as for the nominal bonds, explained before. 
However, we are working with returns in R$. Therefore, we should also consider the 
volatility of the exchange rate. Since  V@R is about computing variances, we have to take 
account of the covariances between the returns of the exchange rate (the rate of 
depreciation) and the yields of the dollar-linked bonds for the several vertices (maturities). 
 
Figure 6 displays the volatility yield curve for the returns of the dollar-linked bonds. Since 
there are no liquid secondary markets for these bonds in Brazil, the volatilities are inferred 
from the prices of derivative securities at the BM&F—The Brazilian Commodities and Futures Exchange—, and, as before, must be interpreted as approximations that exclude the 
liquidity risk. 
 
The extremely high volatilities at the beginning of the sample were caused by the very wild 
fluctuations of the US dollar during the first weeks of the depreciation, when it overshot 
from 1.21 R$ to 2.12 R$. In the derivatives market we used to get the data, the interest rate 
paid by a hypothetical dollar-linked-bond is determined by subtracting the forward 
premium (the expected depreciation plus the exchange rate risk) from the domestic interest 
rate. When the exchange rate is varying a lot (see Figure 7), that causes these implied rates 
to move a lot.
9 Figure 7 shows the volatility of the spot US$/R$ daily exchange rate. 
Incidentally, these figures do not seem to corroborate any “fear of floating” in Brazil. 
 
Figure 8 displays the V@R for the dollar-linked-bonds in % of the total dollar-linked debt. 
It is substantially higher than the nominal bond V@R. This is a natural corollary of the fact 
that the risk h ere is measured against the basic interest rate in R$ (the Selic), and not 
against a return is US$. 
 
Although the period covered in this study does not include the resumption of the Central 
Bank trading in foreign exchange derivatives, the  V@R measure just described is a very 
natural way to convey the increase in risk when the Central Bank issues foreign exchange 
swaps. 
3.1.3. Zero-Duration Bonds 
Zero-duration bonds, by definition, bear no market risk. This is because this bond i s 
redeemed by the initial value capitalized by the accumulation of the daily basic interest rate 
(Selic). Since the present value of any asset is computed by discounting its redemption 
value by the accumulation of the daily Selic rates, the present value o f this asset is the 
same, no matter what is the path of the Selic rate.
10 Therefore, this bond bears no market 
risk. 
 
The reader familiar with the macroeconomic literature on optimal taxation may find quite 
strange to attribute zero risk to bonds that immediately start paying higher interest rates 
when there is an interest shock. After all, a positive interest shock coupled with a debt 
structure heavily weighted in zero-duration bonds is bound to generate a heavy burden to 
the fiscal budget, negatively impacting the necessary taxation. This only highlights the fact 
that the perception of risk to market players is different from the one relevant to the 
government. Nevertheless, it is possible to adapt the threshold against which the  V@R is 
measured. Government revenues growth would be an ideal however infeasible threshold. 
The same applies to nominal GDP growth. Inflation would probably be the best candidate, 
                                                 
9 In spite of this plausible explanation, we are trying to get hold of an alternative dataset to check the 
numbers. 
10 Of course, if the Selic rate were to be kept at a very low level, incompatible with the interest parity 
conditions, it would lose its place as a market benchmark, and the zero duration bond would no longer be 
considered devoid of interest rate risk. That would be a different story from the recent increase in the 
perception of the credit risk of these bonds, which are analyzed later. given the availability of price level data. However, returns on price-level-linked bonds are 
very hard to come by, as explained next. 
3.1.4. Price-Level-Linked Bonds 
 
To compute the risk of price-level-linked bonds is a really difficult task. This is because on 
top of the inexistence of a liquid market for price-level-linked bonds, the derivatives market 
for the yields on those bonds is not only very illiquid, but is also very new. Therefore, we 
have very little data to work with. Appendix 1 describes all the hypotheses made to achieve 
proxies for the V@R of the price-level-linked bonds. 
 
Figure 9 displays the first approximation (proxy 1) to the price-level-linked bonds V@R. It 
considers only the inflation volatility, neglecting the possible yield (real interest rate) 
variation. Given the low inflation volatility, proxy 1 leads to very low V@R measures. 
 
Proxies 2, 3 and 4 try to take into account the volatility of the yields, which is much higher 
than inflation volatility. As a result, the V@R figures grow more than tenfold. 
 
The  V@Rs as percentages of the total price-level-linked debt are displayed in Figure 11, 
together with the  V@R for the nominal and exchange-rate-linked bonds. We see that the 
proxies 2, 3 and 4 for the price-level-linked bonds are much higher than the other two for 
the months after the devaluation, while proxy 1 is lower. Probably, the true risk measure is 
somewhere in between proxy 1 and the other three proxies. 
 
3.1.5. Total V@R 
 
To compute the total  V@R we must basically compute a variance of the overall return. 
That requires accounting for the diversification effects that arise within the portfolio. For 
that, we would need all the covariances between all the risk factor considered previously, 
e.g., the covariance between the yield of a dollar-linked bond of 250-day maturity and the 
yield of a nominal bond of 20-day maturity. The data required for some of those 
covariances are not available. Furthermore, by assuming extreme assumptions, i.e., 
correlations equal to +1 and  –1 between all variables, we may get the lower and upper 
bounds of the total V@R. 
 
Figure 12  displays the total  V@R together with the debt figures (the zero-duration debt is 
excluded because it bears no market risk). Figure 13 displays the V@R as % of the debt. 
We see that after being very high immediately after the devaluation, the  V@R decrease 
during 2000, and rose again in 2001, hovering below 1%  per day at that year-end. 
 
Figure 14 displays the  V@R as a percentage of GDP. We see the same pattern, with the 
V@R decreasing after the devaluation from 0.6% to 0.1% of GDP by the end of 2000. 
During 2001, the V@R increases again, doubling by the third quarter, when it flattened and 
fell a little. Figure 15 displays the (daily) V@R as a % of (monthly) treasury revenues. The 
lines follow the same pattern, but the magnitudes become more telling. After reaching almost 30% of the revenues, the V@R was, at the end of the sample, at the 10% of monthly 
revenues level. That means that the daily  V@R was almost three times the daily treasury 
revenue, which is probably a very large magnitude. 
 
As commented before, this measure is probably misleading as the relevant measure for the 
government. This is because when the interest rates rise, the interest payments related to the 
zero-duration bonds also rise, but the present value of these bonds do not, implying a zero 
market risk. The V@R is a good measure of the risk born by the private sector in holding 
the domestic public debt. Therefore, during 2001, not only the debt size grew substantially 
(see Figure 1), but the  V@R as a percentage of the total debt also doubled, thereby 
increasing a lot the risk born the private sector in holding it. This is compatible with the 




3.2. Cash-Flow at Risk (CF@R) 
 
The risk factors analyzed in the last subsections impact also the government’s cash flows. 
For example, fluctuations in risk factors as exchange and interest rates affect other 
components of the fiscal accounts besides the public debt. For example, the gains obtained 
by private agents that purchased exchange rate linked bonds in times of depreciation are 
partially taxed away through the income tax. This appears as an increase in tax revenues in 
times of depreciation. A V@R for the public debt would overestimate the negative impact 
of exchange rate depreciation on the fiscal accounts, because it would miss the increase in 
income tax. To correct this flaw, we borrow the concept of Cash Flow At Risk from the 
corporate literature. 
 
Non-financial enterprises are not so well characterized by their portfolios. To assess the 
risk, it is more important to quantify the impact of the risk factor in the profits and losses of 
the firms. For example, a large depreciation is bound to have a substantial negative effect in 
the future profits of an import firm, notwithstanding the fact that the immediate impact on 
its portfolio could be a positive one. The Cash Flow at Risk (CF@R) takes account of the 
impact on the firm’s cash flow  (Jorion, 2001, p. 366). The  CF@R methodology (see 
Jorion, 2001, p. 366) requires the following steps: 
1)  Compute the exposures of the cash flows to the risk factors; 
2)  Model the behavior of the risk factors; and 
3)  Simulate the risk factors and get the distribution of the resulting cash flows. The 
CF@R will be the difference between the 50
th and the 5
th percentile of that 
distribution. 
 
In order to get item (1) above, we ran a VAR  (Vector Auto-Regression) in proxies of the 
following five variables: real exchange rate, real interest rate, inflation, GDP growth, and 
primary surplus to GDP ratio. Non-stationary behavior was identified in a few of the series. 
This is probably due to the significant changes that fiscal and exchange rate policies 
underwent within the period. After the floating of the exchange rate in January, 1999, inflation shot up and has decreased afterwards, in line with a falling schedule of inflation 
targets. To account for the negative trend while inflation was converging to the new lower 
level, we constructed a variable—the inflation gap—that measures the deviation of actual 
inflation from the target, which is computed by interpolating the two targets for adjacent 
years. A similar thing was done with the fiscal surplus to GDP ratio. Since the last quarter 
of 1998, Brazil has an agreement with the IMF that promises to fulfill certain targets for the 
primary surplus, among other requirements. During 1999, the primary f iscal surplus to 
GDP ratio increased from zero to around the 3.5% level where it has been kept until today. 
Also, to account for the trend, we constructed a variable—the fiscal gap—that measures 
the deviation of actual surplus from the target, which is computed by interpolating the two 
targets for adjacent years. From the definitions used, the larger the inflation gap, the higher 
the inflation; and the larger the fiscal gap,  the lower the primary surplus. In other words, 
positive values for the inflation a nd fiscal gaps mean that the targets are not being fulfilled. 
The results are in Table 3.1. Appendix 2 contains the time-series variables charts. 
 
The risk factors in this case are the contemporaneous shocks to the variables. We assume 
they are multinormally distributed with variances and covariances equal to those estimated 
through the VAR. 
 
Finally, we use Monte Carlo simulation to get item (3) and compute the CF@R. The results 
are drawn in Figures 16 and 17. 
 
Figure 16 displays the histogram of the variable used to proxy for the primary surplus—the 
fiscal gap. As explained before, when the fiscal gap is negative, the primary surplus target 
(currently at 3.5% of GDP) is surpassed. We simulated 1,000 one-month-ahead scenarios.  
The little dots represent the 5
th and the 95
th percentiles. We are interested in the latter, since 
higher results mean lower primary surpluses. We see that the primary surplus target is not 
at all in jeopardy when one considers the shocks to the exchange rate, the interest rate, the 
GDP growth, and inflation. On the contrary, those shocks tend to increase the primary 
surplus (the starting value was zero). 
 
If we keep shocking the system for 12 months, we get a slightly different result. Figure 17 
shows this case. The distribution of the fiscal gap is more spread, as expected, but the 95
th 
percentile is still negative, meaning that obtaining the fiscal target is not a problem if the 
past performance is kept. Since the fiscal performance for the period analyzed, 1999-2001, 
has been impeccable, this is not a surprise. Also, since we do not analyze the fiscal 
accounts, but only the impact of the shocks to the exchange rate, the interest rate, the GDP 
growth, and inflation on the primary surplus, neither serves the result as an assurance that 
the fiscal stance will be kept in the future.  
 
Table 3.1 
Vector Auto-Regression Estimation 
 
   
Sample: 1999:05 2002:01 
 Included observations: 33 
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses 








D DRER(-1)   0.433689   0.152833   0.028182  -0.262320  -0.039040 
   (0.17612)   (0.14628)   (0.02919)   (0.09512)   (0.00962) 
   (2.46246)   (1.04479)   (0.96540)  (-2.75767)  (-4.05936) 
           
Real Interest Rate (-1)  -0.109766   0.710234   0.008366  -0.062864  -0.010766 
   (0.17517)   (0.14549)   (0.02903)   (0.09461)   (0.00957) 
  (-0.62663)   (4.88164)   (0.28815)  (-0.66445)  (-1.12557) 
           
Inflation Gap(-1)  -0.399522   0.528311   0.959459  -0.582926  -0.085243 
   (0.66246)   (0.55022)   (0.10980)   (0.35780)   (0.03617) 
  (-0.60309)   (0.96017)   (8.73800)  (-1.62919)  (-2.35644) 
           
Output Growth(-1)  -0.140137   0.027067  -0.014530  -0.559655  -0.020766 
   (0.28852)   (0.23964)   (0.04782)   (0.15583)   (0.01575) 
  (-0.48571)   (0.11295)  (-0.30384)  (-3.59140)  (-1.31804) 
           
Fiscal Gap(-1)   3.699937   3.047467  -0.619063  -2.087710   0.287218 
   (2.56685)   (2.13196)   (0.42545)   (1.38638)   (0.14017) 
   (1.44143)   (1.42942)  (-1.45506)  (-1.50588)   (2.04914) 
           
C   0.030247   0.030481  -0.001198   0.011345  -0.000124 
   (0.02199)   (0.01827)   (0.00365)   (0.01188)   (0.00120) 
   (1.37525)   (1.66861)  (-0.32867)   (0.95505)  (-0.10354) 
 R-squared   0.322041   0.568699   0.877845   0.404351   0.637631 
 Adj. R-squared   0.196493   0.488829   0.855224   0.294045   0.570525 
 Sum sq. resids   0.024557   0.016941   0.000675   0.007164   7.32E-05 
 S.E. equation   0.030158   0.025049   0.004999   0.016289   0.001647 
 F-statistic   2.565080   7.120266   38.80624   3.665736   9.501918 
 Log likelihood   72.02900   78.15509   131.3391   92.35659   167.9802 
 Akaike AIC  -4.001758  -4.373035  -7.596311  -5.233732  -9.816979 
 Schwarz SC  -3.729665  -4.100943  -7.324218  -4.961640  -9.544887 
 Mean dependent   0.007124   0.100634   0.008873   0.003310  -0.002881 
 S.D. dependent   0.033644   0.035035   0.013137   0.019386   0.002513 
 Determinant Residual Covariance   1.79E-21       
 Log Likelihood   554.1592       
 Akaike Information Criteria  -31.76722       
 Schwarz Criteria  -30.40676       
 
 3.3. V@R and CF@R Together 
 
We may now consider the two measures together, the V@R and the CF@R. As explained 
in Section 2.2, considering the impact of the shocks to the exchange rate, the interest rate, 
the GDP growth, and inflation tends to improve the primary surplus. Therefore, it would 
tend to lower the budgetary impact of negative shocks that increase the debt. In other 
words, the primary surplus tend to act as a shock absorber (albeit a weak one) to the 
increase in the debt stemming from shocks to the exchange rate, the interest rate, the GDP 
growth, and inflation. This may be explained, for example, by of the extra income tax that 
the recipients of the higher interest rates that are paid on government debt when the 
exchange rate depreciates or the basic interest rate (Selic) is raised m ust pay. However, to 
determine exactly where this increase in the primary surplus comes from it would be 
required a study of the fiscal accounts, which is beyond the scope of  this paper. 
 
A very interesting complement to this study would be to consider a V@R measure through 
Monte Carlo simulation. This would allow us to simulate together both the primary surplus, 
as done through the CF@R, and the debt. This procedure would provide a consistent joint 
measure of total risk implied to the fiscal accounts by the shocks to the exchange rate, the 
interest rate, the GDP growth, and inflation.   
4. Rollover Risk 
The policymaker's decision of what kind of debt to float (denomination, indexation, and 
maturity) may be described as follows. Given the government's objective function, the debt 
manager has to decide which bonds and in what quantities to float. The debt manager 
maximizes the government's objective function based on the history of the rates of return  of 
the several bonds and their statistical properties (expected return, variance, etc.).
11 
This maximization problem may be interpreted as the symmetric of the portfolio allocation 
decision, in which the investor decides his portfolio composition by maximizing his utility 
function defined over wealth or consumption. Several models of portfolio allocation are 
available, the most famous being the Mean-Variance analysis of Markowitz [1952].
12  
Only very strict hypotheses may justify that expected utility be defined exclusively over 
expected returns and variances for arbitrary distributions of returns and utility functions.
13  
Nevertheless, Mean-Variance (MV) analysis, since its development by Markowitz fifty 
years ago, has become by far the most widely known principle of portfolio allocation. 
Here we adapt the MV analysis for the public debt manager problem. Two features of this 
adaptation are worth of noting. First, the expected return for the bond holder is converted in 
expected cost for the debt manager. Therefore, the debt manager dislikes higher expected 
return. Second, the safest asset for the bondholder (let’s say, the asset perfectly indexed to 
consumption) is the riskiest for the government. What happens here is that the risk is 
shifted from one side to the other.  
Another important risk source that is considered by the debt manager is the rollover risk. 
Several studies emphasize the importance of not allowing large portions of the public debt 
to mature at the same time, since that may expose the government to pay abnormally high 
rates of return to roll the debt over, or even be forced to monetize the domestic debt or 
default on the foreign debt. Therefore, lengthening the debt maturity is also an objective of 
the debt manager in order to avoid the rollover risk. We posit a very simple way to model 
                                                 
11 Missale [1999] describes several approaches to the debt management problem. 
12 The model requires very restrictive assumptions, which are contradicted by realities in Brazil:  markets are 
not perfect (taxes, regulations, short selling), investors are not rational price takers, there is no risk-free asset 
with unlimited borrowing, assets are not fully liquid and divisible. 
13 As shown by Huang and Litzenberger [1988], pp. 60-62, there are basically two ways to justify the mean-
variance approach. First, for arbitrary distributions of returns, quadratic utility would suffice for expected 
utility to be defined only over the mean and the variance of the rates of return. Unfortunately, quadratic utility 
also implies satiation and increasing absolute risk aversion, which are undesirable properties, since most 
individuals are  believed to prefer more wealth to less and to treat risky investments as normal goods. Second, 
for arbitrary preferences, the mean-variance model would also follow from the assumption that the rates of 
return on risky assets are multivariate normally distributed (this is a sufficient, not a necessary condition). 
Normal distributions are unbounded from below, which is inconsistent with limited liability and economic 
theory, which attributes no meaning to negative consumption. Also, rates of return are known  to possess 
skewed and leptokurtic (fat tails) distributions, which is not the case of the normal distribution (Campbell, Lo, 
and Mackinlay [1997], pp. 16-19). this rollover risk that is compatible with MV analysis, so that we can still rely on its well-
known mathematics to develop the policy implications.  
 
4.1. Mean-Variance with Rollover Risk 
The goal is to adapt the widely used MV analysis of Markowitz [1952] to the debt 
management problem, also incorporating the rollover risk. In order to do that, we will resort 
to an example with two assets, and then will generalize the problem to three or more kinds 
of bonds.  
4.1.1. An example with two assets 
Suppose there are only two bonds. The nominal bond is a regular zero-coupon bond. Its 
return in domestic currency, R$, is known in advance. The other kind of bond is the 
floating bond, whose return varies with the interest rate.  For the sake of this example, we 
assume the following parameter values: 
TABLE 4.1: PARAMETERS VALUES 
 
Bond kind  Expected Return 
(negative) 
Standard Deviation  Maturity (months) 
Nominal  -10%  1%  1 
Floating  -8%  5%  36 
 
We also assume that the rates of return on both assets have zero correlation. Note that the 
governments dislikes expected return, therefore,  ceteris paribus, the debt manager would 
like to maximize the negative of the expected return, which corresponds to cost 
minimization. This, of course, i s the symmetric of the standard investor attitude, which 
seeks to maximize the expected return.  
Note also that the floating bond volatility (standard deviation) is higher that the nominal 
bond’s, which may sound counterintuitive despite the difference in  maturities. The 
explanation, besides the longer maturity of the floating bond, is that for the government 
what counts is the volatility of the deflated future value at the maturity, not the volatility 
of the marked-to-market price (the volatility of the present discounted value of the bond). 
For example, take a floating bond perfectly indexed to the interest rate, as the zero-duration 
bond. When the interest rate rises, the bond’s present discounted value does not change. 
However, the amount in R$ to be disbursed at maturity increases substantially, and, if inflation remains stable, so does the real value of the disbursement. This is assumed to be 
the volatility (market risk) that matters for the government.
14  
Again, as in the case of expected return, the government objective function is the opposite 
of the investor. However, since variance is independent of the deviation from the mean 
sign, it is nonsense to change the sign, as we did with the expected return. The adaptation 
that makes sense is to realize that an indexed bond, i.e., a bond whose present discounted 
value varies very little, thereby being a safe investment for the holder, is very risky for the 
issuer, i.e., the government. That is what is accomplished by measuring the standard 
deviation in the way sketched above.  
Therefore, one could approximate the standard deviation of the nominal bond by the 
standard deviation of monthly inflation, and the standard deviation of the floating bond by 
the standard deviation of the three-year  real interest rate. The numbers in the example are 
merely for illustrative purposes. 
With these adaptations, the MV diagram for the government is displayed in Chart 1. The 
governments’ indifference curves should be positively sloped and convex, with the 
government’s objective function increasing as the curves move toward the northwest. 
Therefore, the efficient set is formed by all combinations (portfolios) of bonds that are 
above the minimum-variance portfolio, as it is the case in standard MV analysis.  
4.1.2. Rollover Risk and the Minimum Degree of Indexation 
So far the adaptations made in MV analysis are fairly mild. Now, we introduce a new 
source of risk, the refinancing (rollover) risk. It is the risk that the debt manager may be 
placed in a corner when she needs to rollover a large portion of the debt, thereby having to 
offer extremely high yields (low bond prices). Ideally, such risk should show up in the rate 
of return distributions, i.e., the probability distribution of bond returns should incorporate 
these “corner” events. Here, we take a short-cut, that may correspond to a distribution 
which incorporates these corner events. 
The rollover risk depends positively on how well spread through time the bonds’ maturities 
are. The more spread apart they are, the lower the risk that the debt manager be placed in a 
corner. A proxy for how well spread the bonds’ maturities are is the average maturity of the 
bond. The issuance of very short-maturity bonds tends to concentrate the bonds’ 
redemption, e.g., if only one-month bills were issued, the whole public debt would 
eventually mature within the following month. 
Therefore, one possibility for modeling the rates of return distribution of public bonds is 
that its variance varies according to the average maturity of the debt stock. T he higher the 
debt average maturity, the lower the rollover risk, and the lower the variance of the bonds’ 
returns at the placement auctions. We could call this model HCDM, for Heteroskedasticity 
Conditional on Debt Maturity.  
                                                 
14 We could alternatively, adapt the model to other risk factors by measuring the volatility of the ratio of the 
bond price to the GDP, or even the ratio of the bond price to the fiscal revenues. With this interpretation in m ind, we go one step further and model this conditional 
heteroskedasticity by adding to the variance a quadratic term that accounts for the debt 
maturity. This quadratic term is decreasing on debt maturity, being zero when maturity is 
the highest possible.  Therefore, for our two-bond example, the negative of the expected 






RN = nominal bond return 
RF = floating bond return  
a  = portfolio weight on the nominal bond  
(1-a)  = portfolio weight on the floating bond 
MRN  = nominal bond maturity 
MRF = floating bond maturity  
h = rollover risk weight 
E(.) = return’s expected value 
F(.) = return’s standard deviation 
D = returns’ correlation coefficient 
The parameter  h is the weight that incorporates to the variance the effect of the rollover 
risk. Chart 2 shows how the incorporation of rollover risk affects the MV analysis. The 
curve labeled  h=0 is the one of Chart 1. As  h increases, the risk, as measured by the 
modified standard deviation, also increases for all portfolios but the one with 100% 
allocated in the longest maturity bond. For  h=0.000002, the risk of the 100% short-term 
portfolio equals the risk of 100% long-term portfolio. For h>0.000002, the risk of the 100% 
short-term portfolio exceeds the risk of 100% long-term portfolio. As  h keeps increasing, 
the rollover risk becomes completely dominant, as shown in Chart 3. 
Chart 4 displays the same data in the space Maturity vs. Standard Deviation. Since the 
portfolio maturity is also a linear convex combination of the two bonds’ maturities, as it is 
the case of the expected returns, Chart 4 has the same shape as Chart 2. 
One interesting feature displayed by Charts 2 and 4 is that the efficient set decreases as h 
increases. That means that the number of acceptable debt structures decreases as the 
rollover risk becomes increasingly important for the government, as, for example, it would 
be the case in a contagion model where a neighbor country got hit by a negative shock.  
This seems to be precisely what happened in Brazil during the Russian crisis, when the 
government became increased fearful of not being able to roll over its very short maturity 
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a a s rs s a s adebt. Figures 1 and 2 show that after May, 1998, the nominal (shorter maturity) bonds were 
replaced by the zero-duration (longer maturity) bonds. This caused the average maturity to 
increase, lowering the rollover risk. The market risk, however, increased substantially. 
When the interest rates were raised—firstly to counteract  the succession of speculative 
attacks that eventually led to the devaluation of January, 1999, and secondly to avoid the 
exchange rate overshooting that followed—, the risk turned into reality, and the debt 
increased much more than it would have increased  were it composed in its majority by 
nominal (nominal) bonds. 
 
TABLE 4.2: MINIMUM INDEXATION AND MINIMUM MATURITY 




0.000000000  4%  2.4 
0.000001000  35%  13.3 
0.000002000  50%  18.5 
0.000005000  72%  26.2 
0.000009000  82%  29.7 
0.000010000  83%  30.1 
0.000100000  98%  35.3 
0.000406041  100%  36 
What happened in Brazil may be modeled by an increase in the parameter  h. The debt 
structures that leave the efficient set as h increases are the ones with more nominal and less 
floating bonds. As the rollover risk becomes more important, the “optimal” debt structure 
tends to display a longer maturity, precisely to diffuse the rollover risk. Table 2 shows this 
characteristic of the model. With  h sufficiently high (equal to 0.000406041 and above), 
only 100% floating bonds portfolios are acceptable. 
4.2. The Problem with Multiple Bonds 
In the two-bond case, we saw that the "modified" variance was: 
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=With 3 bonds, the third bond being the longest, the term that is added to the variance is: 
 
Therefore, it is easy to see that, in order to compute the "modified" variance, all one needs 
to do is: 
  1 - reorder the n bond kinds, so that the last one is the longest; 
  2 - take the original variance-covariance matrix, W (n x n), and consider the 
principal minor ((n-1) x (n-1)) formed by elimination of the last row and column; 
  3 - to each cell (Wi,j) of the principal minor add [h(Mi - Mn) (Mj - Mn)], i < n , j > n ; 
  4 - put back the n
th  row and n
th  column that had been previously eliminated to get 
the modified variance-covariance matrix, WMOD ; 
  5 - the modified variance is simply     
                                    Modified Variance = l´  WMOD l   
where, 
l = vector (n x 1) of portfolio weights; 
WMOD = modified variance-covariance matrix. 
Now, all we need to do is to prove that the modified variance-covariance matrix is positive 
definite. This is easily accomplished by noting that the modified variance is obtained by 
adding to the original variance (itself a quadratic form with a positive definite matrix) a 
quadratic term that is greater than zero whenever all bonds are not of the same (i.e., the 
longest) maturity. Therefore, the modified variance-covariance matrix must also be positive 
definite. 
With the modified v ariance-covariance matrix being a legitimate positive-definite variance-
covariance matrix, all the MV results go through as if we were dealing with a standard 
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= - - - + + hvariance-covariance matrix. We may, thus, rely on the large set of results concerning 
portfolio allocations for multiple assets with Mean-Variance preferences. 
4.3. Maturity Structure and Rollover Risk: Recent Evolution 
 
Until May 2002, the Treasury was following a strategy of mitigating the rollover risk by 
lengthening the debt through the use of indexed bonds. Figure 18 shows the federal bonded 
debt redemption schedules in January 2000; January 2001; January 2002; and April 2002 
(the last available at the time of writing). 
 
Figure 19 shows the same data in a friendlier format. It accumulates the debt of Figure 18, 
and represents it as a percentage of the total debt. Therefore, it can be read as a cumulative 
distribution function. If one wants to know what is the share of the debt that matures until 
six months, all one has to do is to read the value on the y-axis that corresponds to the 6 
Months on the x-axis. A longer and better-distributed debt profile is represented in figure 
19 by a curve that lies below the other one.  Therefore, as mentioned before, one can see 
that until April 2002, successes were being achieved in lengthening the debt. This relative 
success was paid with the increase in risk measured in section 3. However, all this effort is 
currently being lost with the increase in macroeconomic risk that started to worsen 
considerably in May, 2002. 
 
 5. Monetary Policy and Public Debt Management 
 
In this Section we analyze a few issues pertaining to the overlapping of monetary policy 
and public debt management. In every country both policies are related. However, this is 
more so in Brazil, because of the domestic currency substitution process that characterized 
the megainflation of the 80s and the first half of the 90s. 
 
Regular currency substitution was avoided through the provision of regular bank deposits 
that were protected from inflation. T hose deposits, which were considered as money and 
had daily liquidity, were backed by government debt. Monetary policy became completely 
passive because it could not jeopardize the domestic currency substitution mechanism by 
raising interest rates. Although this state of affairs has changed substantially after the Real 
Plan, a few characteristics of today’s monetary operation mechanism are inherited from that 
period. 
5.1. Monetary Policy Regimes and the Demand for Debt 
  
As analyzed elsewhere,
15 Brazil was a ble to retain a fairly stable demand for its national 
currency during the megainflation years through the provision of (domestic) currency 
substitutes protected from inflation erosion. In those years, the Central Bank monetary 
policy was restricted to provide a positive and not very volatile real interest rate. Financial 
intermediaries would carry government bonds in their balance sheets and provide money 
market accounts that were widely perceived as being protected from inflation, unlike the 
regular currency. Were the Central Bank to raise interest rate to deter the inflation, it would 
impinge large losses to the financial intermediaries, thereby jeopardizing their ability to 
provide inflation protected domestic currency substitutes. Not surprisingly, the m onetary 
policy was completely accomodative as inflation drifted upwards until it was successfully 
stoped by the Real Plan of July 1994. 
 
Since monetary policy was  de facto precluded from exerting its main goal, i.e., to fight 
inflation through the interest rate management, debt managers engineered the zero-duration 
bonds (see Section 3) to save the volatility premium that appeared in the bonds` auctions. In 
other words, financial institutions would purchase short-term nominal debt with a sizeable 
discount b ecause of the interest rate risk. Note that the interest rate risk during 
megainflation is essentially driven by the jumps in inflation expectations, which are much 
higher than the changes in the real interest rate. With zero-duration bonds the interest rate 
risk was eliminated, and the government could sell bonds at a higher price. 
 
However, with the zero-duration bonds, monetary policy becomes completely devoided of 
any wealth effect. Interest rates may rise or fall, and the present value of the zero-duration 
debt will remain constant. Of course, this (tautological) statement has to taken with a grain 
of salt. After all, if the domestic interest rate were to fall too much, violating the bounds 
                                                 
15 See Garcia [1996]. imposed by interest parity conditions, a capital outflow would  result, since the domestic 
interest rate would no longer serve as trusted benchmark. 
 
After the Real Plan, financial intermediaries remained addicted to government bonds whose 
prices have very low of zero volatility. Until 1997 (see Figure 1), the lenghtening through 
nominal debt procedeed, only to be interrupted by the Asian crisis. Increases of more than 
2000 basis points in the basic interest rate happened a few times until 1999, all but killing 
the prospects of a demand for long nominal bonds. Although  in the current floating rate 
regime the exchange rate also serves as a shock absorber, thereby decreasing the interest 
rate volatility, the lenghtening of the nominal debt has yet to reach the two-year maturity 
that was being auctioned just before the Asian crisis.  
 
Financial intermediaries used to look for the zero duration bonds that have no market risk 
so that they could provide money market funds whose yields track the basic interest rate 
benchmark (the Selic rate). Quite recently, however, given the i ntroduction of stricter rules 
forcing the fund industry to observe mark-to-market practices, as well as the uncertainty 
pertaining to the electoral process (will the next president tamper with the public debt?), 
even the zero-duration debt has been trading with a sizeable discount (sometimes above 
200 basis points). This discount reflects jointly  liquidity and (mostly) credit risks, and has 
been causing losses for many market funds, forcing them to offer their clients negative 
yields. Negative yields were  considered an anathema in the fund industry, and it is still 
unclear what this new state of affairs—where the agents no longer have (at least the feeling 
of) a complete safe haven from liquidity and credit risks—will entail.  
 
5.2. Reserve Requirements 
 
Reserve requirements were always very large during the megainflation years, and are still 
quite high. Figure 20 shows the reserve requirements evolution, as well the ratio of total 
reserve requirements to M4 (RHS scale). When the Real Plan started, in July 1 994, the 
reserve requirements were raised because of fears that the increase in money demand could 
be confounded with inflationary money printing, and to deter excess credit expansion that 
could jeopardize the initial phase of the plan. As the plan became  more and more 
successful, the reserve requirements were further raised to prevent excessive growth of the 
aggregate demand. Even a reserve requirement of 15% on bank loans was imposed.
16 
 
High reserve requirements serve not only as a deterrence against excessive credit 
expansion—always a danger in a country with such a low total credit to GDP ratio as Brazil 
(less than 30%)—, but also to a very convenient and cheap way of rolling over the debt 
(part of the reserve requirements are to deposited in government  bonds). Since inflation 
targeting was adopted as the monetary policy framework in May 1999, the Central Bank 
has tried to lower the reserve requirements. However, last year, to preclude banks from 
speculating in the exchange rate markets (buying dollars), the Central Bank decided to raise 
                                                 
16 See Garcia [1995]. reserve requirements on time deposits. This year, it did it again in June, with the same 
objective of deterring exchange rate overshooting. Therefore, this tool seems to still be used 
for many different purposes. 
 
Recently, with the introduction of the real-time-gross-settlement payment system, the large 
reserve requirements have proven to be very useful. This is because the Central Bank 
allows banks to use their reserve requirements during the day to settle transactions, thereby 
providing enough extra liquidity to meet the extra liquidity needs that arose from the 
passage of a net-deferrement system to a real-time-gross-settlement payment system. 
 
In summary, it seems that the large reserve requirements that were inherited  from the 
megainflation years will prove to be very difficult to be reduced to the very low levels 
currently in place in most OECD countries, since they have a very high “opportunistic” 
value as a tool to obtain several different objectives.  
5.3. The Financial Transactions Tax (CPMF) 
 
Since it has been reinstated in 1997, the tax on financial transactions (CPMF) has become a 
major revenue source for the budget, as shown in by the numbers below. Currently, it also 
serves as a means to find tax evaders, by picking up those with little (reported) income and 
high payments of financial tax. Recently, Congress has exempted stock market operations 
from the tax, a measure long due. Banks are also exempted in their activities. The financial 
tax is, thus, much more important for the fiscal policy than for monetary policy or for debt 
management. 
 
The financial tax acts as a deterrent to the increase of liquidity of public debt secondary 
markets. Since only financial institutions are exempted from this tax, all other possible 
players in the secondary debt market have to bear this extra cost. Therefore, short-term 
operations involving debt (as repos) become very expensive. The current preferred tax 





Constant R$ Million (Dec/2001)
1997 8,842.45 139,838.13 6.32%
1998 10,096.10 171,230.49 5.90%
1999 9,299.88 249,866.88 3.72%
2000 16,121.53 261,813.03 6.16%
2001 17,804.25 282,150.22 6.31%
CPMF's share of 
the Total 
Total Treasury Revenue CPMF Revenue5.4. Open Market Operations and the Provision of Liquidity to Banks 
 
Open market operations represent the main operating channel linking monetary policy to 
debt management policy. Given the institutional idiosyncrasy that tax and loans accounts 
must be in the Central Bank  (this is a constitutional clause), the Central Bank has a lot of 
work deriving from the administration of the Treasury’s accounts. In days when the civil 
servants get paid, the Treasury first transfers the funds to the banks, and the Central Bank 
must conduct contractionary open market operations to mop up the banks’ excess liquidity 
until actual payments are made. Conversely, in days were the banks are due to transfer to 
the Treasury the taxes they have collected, the Central Bank must conduct expansionary 
open market operations to replenish the banks with reserves. If it did not act in this way, the 
basic interest rate would fluctuate wildly. This is a very interesting feature of the Brazilian 
monetary system: because the interest rate would fluctuate too much if the Central Bank did 
not intervene often, it ends up intervening so strongly as to shut off completely any intra-
day variability in the basic interest rate. 
 
In Figure 21 we look at monthly averages of the lack (positive) and the excess (negative) of 
bank reserves of the entire banking sector. Basically it reflects the amounts the Central 
Banks has to mop up or to replenish in order to clear the market for bank reserves. A 
positive figure means that the aggregate of banks have less reserves than what is required to 
fulfill the reserve requirements. Since the Central Bank is a monopolist in this market, if it 
did not intervene by conducting purchase of government bonds with repurchase (by the 
banks) agreements, the basic interest rate would rise enormously. The reverse would 
happen if banks had reserves in excess of the amount needed to fulfill the reserve 
requirements. The only difference is that in the latter situation, banks may decide not to 
loan the idle funds (out of fear of credit risk, for example) and keep the excess reserves. 
 
As it can be seen from the last part of Figure 21, since the end of 2001, the lack of bank 
reserves has been gradually turned into excess of reserves. This is because the banks have 
been fearsome of purchasing government bonds fearing the credit risk of a possible debt 
default of the next government. Therefore, when the old debt matures, many prefer not to 
purchase new bonds and loan those funds through the open market. Since they get from 
these daily loans to the Central Bank just a few basis points below the interest rate paid in 
the bonds that will mature after the change in administration, they prefer to remain liquid. 
Therefore, it is a case where debt management becomes a case of monetary policy. The 
Central Bank and the Treasury have been trying many different approaches as shortening 
the debt and letting the intra-day Selic rate vary more to entice the banks to lock up the 
higher rates by purchasing the bonds at the auctions. Nevertheless, it remains a distinct 
possibility that the excess reserves position will grow larger as the elections approach, and 
the Central Bank will have to conduct larger operations to mop up liquidity in a daily basis. 
The debt shortening that started in May 2002, was a measure to avoid the increase in the 
excess reserves position. The rationale seems to be that it is preferable to sell short term 
debt than to be forced to roll the same debt overnight. 6.Conclusion and Policy Discussion 
 
The management of the domestic public debt is perhaps  the single most important issue 
currently in the economic policy agenda, as well as in the presidential candidate’s economic 
programs. This is due to its large size (above 50% of GDP), as well as the extremely high 
and counter-cyclical interest rates, which inflicts a higher toll on the budget precisely when 
the economy is weak. Both factors jointly threaten to put the debt in an unsustainable path. 
Simulations
17 show that under reasonable assumptions, the tough fiscal stance, currently 
delivering a primary  surplus of 3.5% of GDP, must be maintained in the next years in order 
to keep the debt to GDP ratio from growing further. 
 
Here, we analyze several aspects pertaining to the management of the debt. Section 2 
studies the causes for the extremely large and f ast growth of the domestic public debt 
during the seven-year period that President Cardoso has been in power (until the end of 
2001). The data show that interest payments were by far the largest culprit for the debt 
growth. Other components, as the accumulation of assets and hidden liabilities were also 
important. Furthermore, given that many of the assets, especially the state debt, are of 
doubtful value, the picture displayed by the net debt figures may underestimate the true 
situation. 
 
The macroeconomic summary behind the data is the following. In the first years of the 
Real, the fiscal stance was quite lax. Given the weak fiscal stance, monetary policy was 
then used to prevent the excessive growth of aggregate demand that would threaten the 
main achievement of the plan, the low inflation. During most of this period, foreign capital 
was flowing in, forcing the government to impose controls in capital  inflows to prevent the 
appreciation of the real.
18 
 
This state of affairs changed after the Asian crisis. T hen, interest rates had to be raised to 
avoid capital outflows, which would threaten the managed exchange rate, and, therefore, 
also threaten inflation stability. This situation became prevalent until the beginning of 1999, 
when the real was floated, and t he new monetary policy regime was created according to 
the new world paradigm of inflation targeting. Since 1998.3, a new, and much tougher, 
fiscal stance had been put in place, with ambitious targets for primary surpluses, which the 
Brazilian government h as been fulfilling until present. However, the composition of the 
debt, roughly half indexed to the short term interest rate and a fourth indexed to the 
exchange rate, maintained the debt growth rate at high levels in face of external shocks that 
caused real depreciation and required higher interest rates to ensure that the inflation targets 
were not abandoned. 
 
Section 3 implements risk measures for the domestic public debt. Value at Risk ( V@R) 
measures are computed for the different debt components, as well as for the aggregate. 
Given the lack of liquidity, which prevented us from having the necessary bonds’ prices, a 
few heroic assumptions had to be made to allow the computation of the V@R. The results 
                                                 
17 Several investment banks (JP Morgan, Deutsch Bank, etc) regularly produce debt sustainability 
simulations. See also Bevilaqua and Garcia [2002].  
18 See Garcia and Valpassos [2000]. show that the risk shot u pwards during the floating of the currency, when volatility grew a 
lot. After that, it decreased steadily until the beginning of 2001, when several shocks started 
hitting the economy (the recession in the US, the contagion from Argentina, the energy 
crisis and political problems among the government allies in Congress). All these increased 
volatility and risk, as measured through theV@R. 
 
The V@R measures the worst plausible loss of a portfolio present value. Present values in 
Brazilian domestic currency are usually computed by discounting the future values by the 
domestic interest rate (Selic). Therefore, the zero-duration bonds, whose stock amounts to 
more than 50% of the domestic public debt, bear no risk. This causes the  V@R to 
underestimate the budgetary risk that is relevant for government decisions. After all, when 
interest rates are raised, the present value of the zero-duration debt does not change, while 
the real value of interest payments d o increase, be they deflated by the price level, or 
computed as % of GDP. Even with this bias toward underestimation, when computed as a 
percentage of Treasury’s revenues, the risk proves to be very high. Each day, the worst 
plausible loss (increase) in the value of the domestic debt corresponds roughly to three 
times the daily Treasury’s revenue. 
 
In order to incorporate the impact of the shocks to the budget, the concept of cash flow at 
risk ( CF@R) was adapted to the government budget. The impacts of several variables as 
the interest rate, the exchange rate, the GDP growth rate and inflation on the primary 
balance were computed through a vector auto-regression (VAR). The results show that 
shocks to those variables have a positive impact on the primary surplus, although the 
magnitude is small when compared to the increase in the debt value that the same shocks 
would cause. It remains to be constructed a risk measure that jointly incorporates the effects 
of the shocks on both the budget and the debt portfolio. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that 
the debt current debt structure is extremely risky, because volatility increases precisely 
when the economy weakens, draining fiscal resources to serve the debt precisely when they 
are mostly needed. 
 
Section 4 considers the rollover risk in the context of the widely known mean-variance 
analysis. It is shown that the decisions regarding the debt composition that were taken in 
May, 1998 could be interpreted as shocks that tilted the government’s trade-off between 
market risk and rollover risk. Further work is necessary to implement the model with 
parameters that accurately represent the problem faced by the Brazilian public debt 
manager.  
 
The data show that until April 2002, the maturity structure was being gradually lengthened. 
The increased risk ness was the cost to improve the maturity structure, i.e., market risk was 
increased while refinancing risk was reduced. The recent emergence of large discounts on 
the zero-duration bonds, requiring the Treasury to shorten the debt seems to be a further 
unfortunate step. Not only the debt structure is extremely risky from the market risk 
perspective, but also the Treasury is being increasingly pressured to shorten the debt, 
thereby increasing the refinancing risk, because of the perception that credit risk has 
increased. 
 Finally, Section 5 considers several important points pertaining to the overlapping of 
monetary policy and debt management. First it is shown that despite the fact that 
megainflation was defeated almost eight years ago, some of its effects are still present, as it 
happens with the domestic demand for public debt. During the megainflation years, the 
demand for the public debt and for the domestic currency were kept alive by preserving the 
value of the former in face of very high and volatile inflation, and by making the latter a 
vehicule to assess the inflation protected asset. Therefore, Brazilians firms and households 
with access to the banking sector got used to paying transactions w ith chunks of 
government bonds (although most ignored it). Positive real interest rates with daily 
liquidity were the reasons why Brazil did not undergo a currency substitution process as 
many of its neighbors. Monetary policy became completely passive to  allow for this to 
happen. 
 
This habit of having daily liquidity and high real interest rates did not subside with inflation 
stability. Money market funds are still obliged to offer positive real returns with daily 
liquidity, or so they feel. The problems t hat are currently surfacing in the domestic debt 
markets, as the presidential elections polls bring fears that a (partial) default may be 
favored by the next president, reflect to a great extent this habit that Brazilians grew 
accustomed to having. As even zero-duration bonds, which are free from interest rate 
(market) risk, begin to be traded at large discounts reflecting credit and liquidity risks, 
money market funds are no longer allowed to pretend that they are able to offer daily 
liquidity with no risk. This is bound to have an impact on the demand for domestic debt, 
although it is not currently clear to which extent. 
 
The many different roles of reserve requirements were also reviewed. The general 
conclusion is that the high reserve requirements very o ften help the monetary authority to 
achieve certain ancillary goals that have nothing to do what reserve requirements are for. 
For example, reserve requirements were used as a means to control credit expansion, 
speculation in the foreign exchange markets,  and to provide intra-day limits for banks to 
operate in the newly released real-time-gross-settlement payment system. For that option 
value, it is likely that reserve requirements will be kept for much longer at the current very 
high levels. 
 
The financial transaction tax detrimental role in preventing greater liquidity in the public 
debt secondary market is also mentioned. Finally, the management of bank reserves 
through open market operations is studied. The Brazilian Constitution mandates that all 
government bank accounts be kept at the Central Bank. This adds a seasonal pattern and a 
lot of noise to the daily work conducted by the Central Bank desk in setting the interest 
rate. It would be a good idea to allow the Treasury to keep its accounts in banks outside the 
Central Bank, since that would free the Central Bank from intervening so often and so 
strongly. We also show that the aforementioned problems in the debt markets are showing 
up in the monetary market as excess liquidity of the banks. 
 
In summary, the overall message regarding the Brazilian domestic public debt market is 
that of an unfinished transition between the mechanism that made possible to prevent 
currency substitution during the megainflation years through the provision of a domestic 
currency substitute to a more standard debt market with different degrees of liquidity, different maturities and different returns. Despite the large variety, most bonds are still seen 
as a means to provide positive real returns with daily liquidity. The separation of cash 
management from long-term savings was never completed. Nor will it be until the next 
president settles down. When he does, however, this is task of utmost importance. 
 
For the lengthening process to proceed, some sort of indexation will likely be necessary. 
After all, eight years after the defeat of megainflation, the longest nominal bond that was 
floated was a two-year bond (in 1997). The inflation risk seems to be very high for a market 
in long nominal bonds to appear. Since the inflation risk is something under the control of 
the government, it is reasonable for the government to offer the private sector insurance 
against it. The provision of insurance against inflation (inflation indexation) serves as a 
commitment device. 
 
However, the same  argument does not apply to offering insurance against neither the 
nominal interest rate or the nominal exchange rate. After all, to index to the daily interest 
rate is akin to providing insurance not only against inflation risk, but also against real 
interest rate risk. Similarly, to index to the daily exchange rate is akin to providing 
insurance not only against inflation risk, but also against real exchange rate risk. In 
principle, there is no good argument for the government to be involved in providing 
insurance against these two real shocks. Therefore, the lengthening process must emphasize 
price-level-linked bonds in lieu of zero-duration or exchange-rate-linked bonds. References 
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TABLE I.1. FEDERAL DEBT USES: 1995 - 2001
In R$ Million Dec/94 Dec/95 Dec/96 Dec/97 Dec/98 Dec/99 Dec/00 Dec/01 Variation Percentage Share
Federal Net Debt (+ Central Bank) 65,836.21 90,406.30 128,413.28 167,741.82 231,267.74 316,221.69 352,967.13 411,771.95 345,935.75 64.62%
  Interest Payments (Federal Government + CB) 18,727.80 22,853.13 20,537.19 54,402.28 88,881.41 54,926.30 66,434.53 326,762.64 61.04%
  Primary Deficit (Federal Government + CB) -3,335.75 -2,907.57 2,374.56 -5,041.51 -22,672.11 -20,430.59 -21,979.78 -73,992.75 -13.82%
1,681.52 214.31 3,823.79 3,402.93 -9,292.19 8,383.79 -19,984.34 -6,722.63 -1.26%
-773.34 2,855.03 26,592.35 5,808.53 -6,514.65 -3,433.79 -1,398.89 23,135.24 4.32%
  Balance Sheet Adjustment Variation 16,142.14 2,646.83 17,813.92 43,524.52 17,537.27 36,714.00 134,378.68 25.10%
  Privatization Adjustment Variation 1,144.00 16,646.14 12,860.27 8,973.03 20,238.56 980.50 60,842.50 11.37%
  Adjustment not Computed by the Central Bank 8,264.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8,264.69 1.54%
Assets 106,558.55 147,888.21 192,459.55 257,349.80 270,151.58 343,338.99 377,796.92 462,963.12 356,404.57 66.57%
  1. Domestic 73,806.29 97,534.72 130,029.31 199,145.60 216,332.39 278,352.22 313,246.24 379,738.69 305,932.40 57.15%
     1.1. FAT 12,800.00 17,728.00 20,486.00 23,291.23 27,878.83 33,405.29 51,092.01 60,977.25 48,177.25 9.00%
     1.2. CB's credits to financial institutions 20,561.00 34,577.00 67,648.00 68,920.00 48,490.18 40,812.82 37,341.00 21,573.00 1,012.00 0.19%
     1.3. Federal Government's credits (Law 8727/93) 8,276.27 10,011.03 11,469.69 12,998.61 3,849.18 4,851.06 4,754.65 19,246.02 10,969.75 2.05%
     1.4. Debt Renegotiations with the States  0.00 0.00 0.00 49,480.37 86,612.46 131,540.25 154,830.36 174,501.56 174,501.56 32.60%
     1.5. Others 32,169.01 35,218.69 30,425.62 44,455.39 49,501.74 67,742.81 65,228.21 103,440.86 71,271.85 13.31%
2. Foreign Reserves 32,752.26 50,353.49 62,430.25 58,204.20 53,819.19 64,986.76 64,550.68 83,224.43 50,472.17 9.43%
Other Debts (-) 112,139.76 131,628.51 147,965.84 172,806.07 178,795.81 245,193.50 241,554.98 279,136.69 173,141.55 32.34%
1. Domestic 46,946.67 57,561.68 72,858.44 97,113.73 86,164.38 97,042.92 91,609.77 92,659.91 42,335.02 7.91%
    1.1 Monetray Base 17,685.00 21,681.00 19,796.00 31,828.00 39,223.00 48,430.00 47,679.00 53,247.00 32,039.00 5.98%
    1.2. Others 29,261.67 35,880.68 53,062.44 65,285.73 46,941.38 48,612.92 43,930.77 39,412.91 10,296.02 1.92%
2. Foreign 65,193.09 74,066.83 75,107.40 75,692.34 92,631.44 148,150.58 149,945.20 186,476.78 130,806.53 24.43%
TOTAL 60,255.00 106,666.00 172,907.00 252,285.55 322,623.50 414,367.18 489,209.07 595,598.38 535,343.38 100.00%
  Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the State 
Owned Enterprises
  Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the 
States and Municipalities 
 
TABLE I.2. FEDERAL DEBT USES: 1995 - 2001
In Percent of GDP Dec/94 Dec/95 Dec/96 Dec/97 Dec/98 Dec/99 Dec/00 Dec/01 Variation Percent Variation
Federal Net Debt (+ Central Bank) 13.06% 13.37% 15.85% 18.67% 25.01% 30.23% 30.89% 33.24% 20.19% 154.58%
  Interest Payments (Federal Government + CB) 2.77% 2.82% 2.29% 5.88% 8.50% 4.81% 5.36% 32.43%
  Primary Deficit (Federal Government + CB) -0.49% -0.36% 0.26% -0.55% -2.17% -1.79% -1.77% -6.86%
0.25% 0.03% 0.43% 0.37% -0.89% 0.73% -1.61% -0.70%
-0.11% 0.35% 2.96% 0.63% -0.62% -0.30% -0.11% 2.79%
0.00%
  Balance Sheet Adjustment Variation 0.00% 1.99% 0.29% 1.93% 4.16% 1.54% 2.96% 12.87%
  Privatization Adjustement Variation 0.00% 0.14% 1.85% 1.39% 0.86% 1.77% 0.08% 6.09%
  Adjustment not Computed by the Central Bank 1.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.22%
Assets 21.14% 21.87% 23.76% 28.64% 29.22% 32.83% 33.07% 37.38% 16.24% 76.85%
  1. Domestic 14.64% 14.43% 16.05% 22.17% 23.40% 26.61% 27.42% 30.66% 16.02%
     1.1. FAT 2.54% 2.62% 2.53% 2.59% 3.01% 3.19% 4.47% 4.92% 2.38%
     1.2. CB's credits to financial institutions 4.08% 5.11% 8.35% 7.67% 5.24% 3.90% 3.27% 1.74% -2.34%
     1.3. Federal Government's credits (Law 8727/93) 1.64% 1.48% 1.42% 1.45% 0.42% 0.46% 0.42% 1.55% -0.09%
     1.4. Debt Renegotiations with the States  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.51% 9.37% 12.58% 13.55% 14.09% 14.09%
     1.5. Others 6.38% 5.21% 3.76% 4.95% 5.35% 6.48% 5.71% 8.35% 1.97%
2. Foreign Reserves 6.50% 7.45% 7.71% 6.48% 5.82% 6.21% 5.65% 6.72% 0.22%
Other Debts (-) 22.24% 19.47% 18.27% 19.23% 19.34% 23.44% 21.14% 22.54% 0.29% 1.32%
1. Domestic 9.31% 8.51% 8.99% 10.81% 9.32% 9.28% 8.02% 7.48% -1.83%
    1.1 Monetray Base 3.51% 3.21% 2.44% 3.54% 4.24% 4.63% 4.17% 4.30% 0.79%
    1.2. Others 5.80% 5.31% 6.55% 7.27% 5.08% 4.65% 3.85% 3.18% -2.62%
2. Foreign 12.93% 10.96% 9.27% 8.42% 10.02% 14.16% 13.12% 15.06% 2.12%
TOTAL 11.95% 15.78% 21.34% 28.08% 34.89% 39.62% 42.82% 48.09% 36.13% 302.34%
  Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the 
States and Municipalities
































































































































































































































US$ Linked Nominal Zero Duration  Price Level Others
FIGURE 1






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Nominal debt V@R
FIGURE 3























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DAILY V@R - National Treasury Dollar Linked Bond (NTN-D)





































































































































































































































































































































































































Total IGP-M Linked Debt - R$ V@R-proxy1
FIGURE 10
Daily V@R IGP-M Linked Debt
proxy 2 (correl = 0); proxy 3 (correl =1); proxy 4 (correl = -1)



























































































































































































































































































































































































V@R Nominal Debt (% Total Nominal Debt) V@R Dollar Linked Debt (% Total Dollar Linked Debt)
V@R-proxy1  (% Total IGP-M Linked Debt) V@R-proxy2  (% Total IGP-M Linked Debt)
V@R-proxy3  (% Total IGP-M Linked Debt) V@R-proxy4  (% Total IGP-M Linked Debt)
FIGURE 12
































































































































































































































































































































































































Maximum V@R/Debt Minimum V@R/Debt
FIGURE 14









































































































































































































Last 12 months GDP Maximum V@R/Last 12 Months GDP Minimum V@R/Last 12 Months GDP 
 
FIGURE 16 


























0.1% of GDP 
FIGURE 15



























































































































































































Montly Treasury Revenue Maximum V@R/Monthly Treasury Revenue Minimum V@R/Monthly Treasury RevenueFIGURE 17 
Fiscal Gap Distribution – 12-month–ahead 
































































































Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jan-00 (RHS) Jan-01 (RHS) Jan-02 (RHS) Apr-02 (RHS)
FIGURE 18 
































































































































































































































































Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Apr-02
FIGURE 19 
Maturity Structure  
 
 





































































































































































































































Mean-Variance Analysis with Rollover Risk




































Mean-Variance Analysis with Rollover Risk













































Mean-Variance Analysis with Rollover Risk












































Maturity with Rollover Risk





























h = 0 h = 0,000001 h = 0,000002 h = 0,000005 h = 0,000009 h = 0,00001  APPENDIX 1: Value-at-Risk Methodology 
 
The Methodology applied to estimate the V@R followed the  RiskMetrics
19 Model as 
described below. The data range is the workdays from January 4




1.1 – Nominal and Dollar Linked Bonds
20 
1.1.1- Volatility Estimation  
 
The Volatilities estimations were computed using the Exponentially W eighted Moving 
Average (EWMA) method as suggested in   RiskMetrics Technical Document with a 160 
days window. The decay factor (l) used was 0,95 and the confidence level was 95%. 
 





















where  r  can be considered null by virtue of being a financial long-period average return, as 
suggested by Riskmetrics.  
 
 
 1.1.2 - Mapping:  
 
The total nominal bonds and total Dollar linked bonds daily value was mapped into selected 
vertices by the RiskMetrics methodology. The vertices chosen were 5, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 
150, 200 and 250 days for the nominal bonds and 5, 20, 60, 120, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1250 
days for the Dollar linked bonds.  
 
A total value with maturity  x* was decomposed in two different vertices,  x  - and  x+, 
respectively, precedent and posterior vertices of x* 
 
The decomposition methodology of  RiskMetrics transforms the original flow into the 
selected vertices considering its historical volatilities and respecting the following basic 
rules: the present value of the decomposed flow must be equal to the original flow, the 
                                                 
19 http://www.riskmetrics.com - RiskMetrics Technical Document  
20 We used as the total stock of Nominal Bonds the total value of the bonds LTN and BBC. The majors Dollar 
linked bonds are the NTN-D and NBC-E, however, we calculated just the NTN-D V@R by virtue of facing 
problems in NBC-E auctions data. market risk of the flow from the decomposition must be equal to the original flow and the 
decomposed flow must have the same sign of the original flow. 
 
The method is based in a quadratic interpolation as described hereafter: 
 
  The factor of decomposition (a): It’s the percentage of the original flow that will be 
decomposed into the precedent vertice. By virtue of respect the basic rules explained above, 
the parameter a is computed by the following quadratic equation: 
 
0 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 2
* = - + - + - + - + + - - x x x x x s s r a a s a s a s , 
 
where we can denominate  + - + - - + - + = x x x x a r r r s s 2
2 2  
              
2 2 2 + + - + - - = x x x b s s s r  




x x c s s - = +  
 





2 - – -




The main target of the V@R is estimate a confidence interval to a portfolio’s value in 
progress to assess a maximum likelihood loss in a period of time. The period considered in 
this document was 1 day.  
 
The  RiskMetrics methodology to compute  the V@R of a portfolio with just two assets is 
explained below. In our case, were used nine vertices to the Nominal Bonds Estimation and 
nine plus one vertices for Dollar Linked Bonds
21. Therefore no more than ten types of 
assets composed the daily portfolio. Thus, the estimation is analogous to the two assets 
case, when considering up to ten assets.  
 
iance R V var @ =  =  ) var( bY ax + =  ) , cov( 2 ) var( ) var( bY ax bY ax + +  
 
V@R  =  xy y x ab b a s s s 2


















































                                                 
21 The Dollar Linked Bonds with coupon payments  have two primitive risk factors: the Dollar linked  Interest 
rate risk and the Spot Dollar risk. Hence, the flow was decomposed into nine vertices considering the Dollar 
linked Interest rate volatility and one vertice considering the Spot Dollar risk, summing up ten. The Nominal 
Bonds, however, have just the interest rate risk factor, and then demand just the time vertices.   1.2 – Inflation-Linked Bonds 
 
The inflation-indexed bonds considered were the ones linked to the General Price Index 
(IGP-M).  
 
1.2.1 – Market-to-Market Pricing 
 
Their market-to-market price is given by the present value of the principal and the coupons 
payments based on the nominal value corrected by the accumulated inflation. Simplifying 

























t I  is the price index projected for the expiring date T,  0 I is the price index on the 
emission date and 
T
t i  is the future interest rate of maturity (T  – t) annualized on a 252 days 
basis.  
 


























































as the future real 
interest rate. Therefore, we can consider the Inflation linked bond having two primitive risk 
factors: the inflation and the future real interest rate (which has two primitive risk factors of 
its own, the future nominal interest rate and the future inflation rate).  
 
However, the data relating to the expected future inflation rate is not available and the data 
of the future real interest rate is available since just October 2001 (rate of the Swap DI x 
IGP-M) . Hence, it is not possible to compute the market-to-market price of the inflation-
linked bonds in Brazil for the period taken into account in this paper and therefore proxies 
had to be made.  
  
1.2.2 – Volatility Estimation 
 
The volatilities estimations were also computed by the EWMA method.  
 
In the inflation monthly volatilities estimations were used a 6 month window, a decay 
factor for 0,9 and a 95% level of confidence. The daily volatility was approximated by 
dividing the monthly volatility by  22 , referred to a workday basis.  
  
The future real interest rate, i.e, the rate of the  Swap DI x IGP-M, volatilities estimations 
were done just for the short period available of October 2001 to April 2002, summing up 
127 daily observations. The methodology was again the EWMA procedure, with a 40 days 
























Thus, is observed an inverted yield c urve of the rate of return volatility of the Swap DI x 
IGP_M. Moreover, looking at this Swaps yield curve, it can be seen that no pattern is 
distinguishable. Those issues are related to the liquidity problems of this Swap since it is a 












































1.2.3 – Value-at-Risk Estimation 
 
The  formulae to estimate the V@R are the same shown in the Section 1.1.3 of this 
appendix.  
 
To estimate the value-at-risk of inflation-linked bonds, some simplifying assumptions were 
necessary:  
 
Proxy 1:  
 
We considered the rate of the Swap DI x IGP-M as a constant, and hence just the inflation 
primitive risk factor was taken into account.  
 
Then the V@R formula was reduced to:  
 
V@R = (total value) x (inflation volatility) 
 
Proxies 2, 3 and 4:  
 
A second type of proxy was generated assuming the rate of the Swap DI x IGP-M with a 
flat term structure (not needing to map the portfolio in time vertices) and assuming its rate 
of return with a constant volatility.  
 
Nevertheless, the second proxy had another difficult point:  the estimation of the 
covariances between the rate of inflation and the rate of return of the Swap DI x IGP-M, 
since the data for this Swap was not available for the period in question. Henceforward, we 
























































































































































































































































DI x IGP-M 30 DI x IGP-M 90 DI x IGP-M 180 DI x IGP-M 360 DI x IGP-M 720 DI x IGP-M 2520used three proxies: one assuming the independence between these variables ( proxy 2 ) , 
another considering perfect positive correlation between them, i.e., the correlation 
coefficient equals to one (proxy 3), and a last proxy considering the hypothesis of a perfect 
negative correlation between them ( proxy 4 ). Then, we could estimate a maximum and a 
minimum value for inflation-linked debt V@R. 
 
 
      
1.3 - TOTAL V@R  
 
The total V@R refers to the nominal, Dollar linked and IGP-M linked debt stocks. The 
methodology adopted w as not conventional, however showed very good results. The 
modification in comparison to the  Riskmetrics methodology surrounds the volatilities and 
the primitive risk factors considerations.  
 
Since we did not have a daily data for the inflation linked V@R, we pointed out to the 
monthly average of the daily V@R  of nominal and dollar linked debt.   In the estimations 
we, then, considered the values of the V@R as a percentage of the total (type of) debt as the 
volatilities to be used in the total V@R computation. Then: 
 
TOTAL V@R =  " ariances cov "
R @ V
.
) D NTN (
R @ V
D

























Where N is the total nominal bonds, D is the total dollar linked bonds and pIGP-M is the total 
IGP-M linked bonds.  
 
For the “covariances” issue, we assumed for the  maximum value of the total V@R as 
having all the correlation coefficients equal 1 and for the  minimum V@R we assumed all 















 APPENDIX 2: Cash Flow at Risk Methodology 
 
2.1 – Vector Auto regression estimation 





































































































































FISCAL GAP 12M ACUM. PRIMARY DEFICIT/ GDP  12M ACUM. TARGET
INFLATION GAP





























































































































































99:01 99:07 00:01 00:07 01:01 01:07 02:01
IPFCRES
 